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A SURVEY OF STATE COPYRIGHT LAW
TAMMY W. COWART*
PAM GERSHUNY**
GWENDA BENNETT HAWK***
I. INTRODUCTION
State legislatures and Congress have enacted numerous anti-piracy
copyright statutes protecting sound recordings. Technological developments
in the early 1970s made duplication of sound recordings both easy and
inexpensive,1 allowing record pirates to make nearly $100 million dollars for
sales of duplicated records in 1971.2 In 1972, Congress gave federal
copyright protection to sound recordings, but all sound recordings made
before February 15, 1972 remained protected under state law.3 Current law
mandates that all pre-1972 sound recordings remain protected under state law
until February 15, 2067.4 At that time, federal law will preempt all state
copyright law protection, and all pre-1972 sound recordings will enter the
public domain.5
In 2009, Congress asked the Register of Copyrights (Copyright Office)
to study the “desirability and means” of extending federal copyright
protection to all sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972.6 The
Copyright Office report on Federal Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound
Recordings recommended that sound recordings made before February 15,
1972 be brought into the federal copyright scheme.7

*
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1
Elizabeth Townsend Gard & Erin Anapol, Federalizing Pre-1972 Sound Recordings: An
Analysis of the Current Debate, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 123, 124 (2012).
2
Michael Erlinger, Jr., An Analog Solution in a Digital World: Providing Federal Copyright
Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 16 UCLA ENT. L.REV. 45, 56-7 (2009).
3
17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012).
4
Id.
5
Well known songs such as the Rolling Stones’ “Brown Sugar” (1971), Elvis’ “Hound Dog”
(1956), and Bing Crosby’s “White Christmas” (1942) as well as many others will all enter the
public domain on this date. See Gard & Anapol, supra note 1, at 124.
6
A Study on the Desirability of and Means for Bringing Sound Recordings Fixed Before
February 15, 1972, Under Federal Jurisdiction, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Dec. 28, 2011),
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound [hereinafter Copyright Office Study].
7
Id.
**
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This paper examines the persistence of state copyright laws, and the
extent to which they still exist in light of federal copyright law to further
understand how those state laws will be affected by possible preemption.
Specifically, the scheme and penalty of unauthorized duplication and
bootlegging statutes are examined from all fifty states. We further address
areas where the Copyright Act would preempt these state laws.

II. HISTORY
The Copyright Act of 1976 defines “sound recordings” as “works that
result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but
not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or
other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.”8 However, sound
recordings were not a category of works regulated in the previous Copyright
Act of 1909.9 The Sound Recording Act of 1971 sought to remedy this
omission and created three categories of sound recording “piracy:” 1) piracy,
2) counterfeiting, and 3) bootlegging.10 Piracy is the unauthorized duplication
and sale of sounds contained in a legitimate recording like a compact disc
(hereinafter “CD”) or cassette tape.11 Counterfeiting is the unauthorized
duplication and distribution of not only recorded sounds but also the original
label artwork, trademark, and packaging.12 Bootlegging is the unauthorized
recording of a live or broadcast performance that is not legitimately
available, for example that of a live concert or studio out-take that is not
intended for release.13 United States federal law and most states’ laws
prohibit all three types of piracy and treat them as criminal offenses.14
The sound recording industry consists of several players, which include
primarily record labels, but also disc replicators and manufacturers, artists,
producers, engineers, and even record stores. Sound recording piracy has
long adversely affected the recording industry, but the combination of
8

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1909), repealed by Copyright Act
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
10
Black’s Law Dictionary actually gives one definition of piracy as, “[t]he unauthorized and
illegal reproduction or distribution of materials protected by copyright, patent, or trademark
law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (Pocket ed. 1996). Piratical activity involving sound
recordings generally falls into one or more of the three categories mentioned.
11
See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 114 (7th ed.
1995) [hereinafter KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL].
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
One important issue affecting the constitutionality of anti-piracy laws is whether the three
types of piracy are “copyright infringement” offenses.
9
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technological development and weak laws and/or enforcement has enabled,
and even encouraged, record pirates to engage in criminal activity. This
accounts for the annual loss of billions of dollars in displaced sales; in fact,
one in three music discs sold is piratical.15 In considering federal legislation
entitled the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982 (hereinafter
“the 1982 Act”),16 the Senate Committee on the Judiciary agreed with
Department of Justice testimony that:
Piracy and counterfeiting of copyrighted material, the theft of
intellectual property, is now a major white-collar crime. The
dramatic growth of this problem has been encouraged by the huge
profits to be made, while the relatively lenient penalties provided
by the current law have done little to stem the tide.17
After the 1982 Act’s passage, Charlie LaRocco (“the legendary ‘Mr.
Big’ of bootlegging circles”) was arrested for the illegal sale of bootleg
CDs.18 A New York publication stated that LaRocco’s manufacture and sales
constituted a multi-million dollar operation, with his third arrest involving
nearly one million bootleg CDs; still, LaRocco scoffed at the notion that he
would be punished for his activities.19 Demonstrating the global magnitude
of the piracy problem, customs officials seized 50,000 pirated CDs, 50,000
kilograms of polycarbonate material used in making CDs, and 400 CD
stampers in the Philippines in October of 1998.20 Criminal gangs from Hong
15

The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (hereinafter “IFPI”) reported
$4.6 billion of piratical product sold globally in 2005. See IFPI, The Recording Industry 2005
Commercial Piracy Report, http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/library/piracy2005.pdf (visited
Mar. 11, 2013). See also KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 11, at 115 (stating that for the
United States in 1987, IFPI reported a $281.7 million loss in sales due to record piracy). In
2013, the IFPI estimated that nearly a third of all internet users still access unlicensed sites.
See IFPI, IFPI Digital Music Report 2013, http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2013.pdf
(visited Mar. 11, 2013).
16
Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91
(effective May 24, 1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318-2319 (1994 & Supp. III
1997)). The ultimate passage of the 1982 Act established a graduated system of criminal
penalties for copyright infringement of sound recordings and audiovisual works and also
established a uniform penalty for trafficking in counterfeit labels. See id.
17
S. REP. NO. 97-274, at 3 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 127, 130 (citing Hearings
on S. 691 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong. 1 (1980) (statement of Renee L. Szybala, Special Assistant to the Associate Attorney
General, United States Department of Justice)).
18
William Bastone, Pirate King Music’s No. 1 Bootlegger Gets Busted Again, THE VILLAGE
VOICE, (Feb. 16, 1999), http://www.villagevoice.com/1999-02-16/news/pirate-king-music-sno-1-bootlegger-gets-busted-151-again/.
19
See id.
20
See Violence Doesn’t Faze Piracy Fighters, BILLBOARD, Dec. 4, 1999.
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Kong and China allegedly funded and organized the operation, which
distributed illegal product to the Philippines, China, and India. Officials from
the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) commented
that they had even experienced violence while enforcing copyright law in
other countries.21
Record pirates used technology developments to produce near-perfect
copies and/or recordings, which made piracy ever more lucrative.22 The
development of new recording media such as the digital video (or versatile)
disc (DVD),23 audio-compression techniques such as MPEG-3 (MP-3),24 and
peer-to-peer software (P2P)25 enabled users to store a greater amount of
information in a smaller space and to transmit—“mass-transmit” if you
will—or share CD-quality music over the Internet at the touch of a button
(or, the click of a mouse).26 Napster and similar developers (iMesh, Cute
MX, Gnutella) created programs that searched the Internet for MP-3 music
files and connected users with those files, regardless of whether the music
was legitimately available, making hundreds of thousands of such files
accessible to users for instant download.27 These and other advances made in
recording technology led to a corresponding increase in the level of piratical
and counterfeiting activities.
21

See id.
See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 93 (1999) [hereinafter SHAPIRO
& VARIAN] (“Digital copies are perfect copies of the original. . . . Illicit CDs can be stamped
out for well under a dollar apiece.”).
23
DVDs are essentially bigger, faster CDs that can hold cinema-like video, better-than-CD
audio, pictures, and computer data. DVD “became the most successful consumer electronics
product of all time” less than three years after it was introduced. DVD Association, DVD
Demystified, http://www.dvddemystified.com/dvdfaq.html#1.1 (visited Mar. 11, 2013).
24
MP-3 is defined as a “digital audio file compressed with a standard definition by the Motion
Pictures Experts Group (MPEG).” What is an mp3?, wiseGEEK,
http://www.wisegeek.org/what-is-an-mp3.htm (visited Mar. 12, 2013). Because MP3s
significantly compress songs, it is a perfect candidate for distributing on the internet. It was
used early on for widespread piracy. What is Internet Piracy?, wiseGEEK,
http://www.wisegeek.org/what-is-internet-piracy.htm, (visited Mar. 12, 2013).
25
“In a P2P network, the ‘peers’ are computer systems which are connected to each other via
the Internet. Files can be shared directly between systems on the network without the need of a
central server. . . . Once connected to the network, P2P software allows you to search for files
on other people’s computers. Meanwhile, other users on the network can search for files on
your computer.” Techterms.org, P2P (Peer-To-Peer), http://www.techterms.org/definition/p2p
(visited Mar. 12, 2013).
26
Computer users may not consider that copyright law applies to such actions, perhaps
because of the ease and convenience of using the Internet. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-339, at 4
(1997).
27
Napster was originally developed to allow users to locate and download music in MP-3
format from one convenient, easy-to-use interface. See Joan E. Solsman, Remember Napster?
Rhapsody is refreshing Europe’s Memory, CNET, June 3, 2013, http://news.cnet.com/83011023_3-57587451-93/remember-napster-rhapsody-is-refreshing-europes-memory/.
22
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The 2005 year-end anti-piracy statistics published by the Recording
Industry Association of America, Inc. (hereinafter “RIAA”) show that
seizure of counterfeit/pirate CDs increased from 246,452 in 2002 to 785,314
in 2003, a 218.6% increase; and then in 2005 to over 1,338,487, another 60%
increase.28 The seizure of counterfeit/pirate/bootleg labels increased from
72,822 in 2002 to 980,308 in 2003 (1306.3% increase) to 4,624,977 in 2004
(372% increase). This increase in piratical activity has encouraged more
changes in federal and state laws in an effort to respond adequately to these
challenges.
The outlook for digital music has improved recently, however. Global
music industry revenues rose by 0.3 percent in 2012 to hit $16.5 billion, the
first year of growth since 1999.29 Digital music revenues also increased by 9
percent to $5.6 billion.30 Some of this trend may be due to the increased
enforcement of existing copyright laws. The cyberlocker service Megaupload
was one of the biggest unlicensed content hosts before it was shut down by
the FBI in early 2012.31 It was estimated that Megaupload generated $175
million in revenues and cost the creative industry roughly $500 million in
damages.32

III. STATE STATUTES
Anti-piracy legislation exists on both the federal and state level.
Unauthorized duplication statutes and anti-bootlegging laws effectively
prohibit all forms of piracy.33 These types of laws are intended to aid in the
investigation and prosecution of record pirates. Congress and state
legislatures have passed such laws and amended existing laws by
strengthening penalties and tightening the definitions of offenses. While
some of these federal and state statutes have passed the constitutionality test,
some are newer and have not yet been tested.
28

See RIAA, 2005 Year-End Anti-Piracy Statistics, http://76.74.24.142/6BE200AF-5DDA1C2B-D8BA-4174680FCE66.pdf (visited March 5, 2013).
29
IFPI, IFPI publishes Digital Music Report 2013,
http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_resources/dmr2013.html (visited June 1, 2013).
30
Id.
31
IFPI, IFPI Digital Music Report 2013: Engine of a digital world,
http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2013.pdf (visited June 1, 2013).
32
Id.
33
Recall that counterfeiting is the unauthorized duplication of the sounds contained on a
phonorecord (piracy) and the unauthorized duplication of the original label artwork,
trademark, and packaging. Hence, prosecutors can bring charges involving counterfeit product
under unauthorized duplication laws. They can also charge such defendants under trafficking
in counterfeit goods statutes and trademark laws. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318, 2320 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
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The following sections address four types of copyright laws by outlining
the current existence of state statutes and federal law, reviewing the histories
of their enactments, and addressing any relevant unique elements of the
particular cause of action. Finally, issues of preemption of state law causes of
action will be addressed.

A. Unauthorized Duplication
Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia currently have statutes
prohibiting the unauthorized duplication of sound recordings.34 At the federal
level, copyright protection did not extend to sound recordings until the Sound
Recording Act of 1971.35 A decade later, Congress passed federal legislation
specifically prohibiting the unauthorized duplication of sound recordings
when it enacted the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982.36
The state statutes are fairly uniform with some notable exceptions.
Louisiana’s statute specifies that it applies only to sound recordings and not
to motion pictures or other audiovisual works.37 Louisiana further authorizes
the court to order the forfeiture or destruction of recordings, labels, and
devices used to engage in unauthorized duplication,38 as does Missouri.39
New York authorizes the seizure and destruction of unauthorized recordings,
but only after the court provides statutory notice to the district attorney and
the custodian of the seized property within thirty days of the final order.40 If
the order to destroy the property is carried out, it may not be sold, auctioned
or further distributed.41
The Supreme Court’s first opinion on copyright preemption, and
specifically on unauthorized duplication, occurred under the Copyright Act
of 1909 (the 1909 Act), which did not have a specific preemption test.42 In
1971, the government charged defendant Goldstein with violating
California’s unauthorized duplication statute by copying several musical
34

Of those statutes, forty-four allow for punishment of unauthorized duplication as a felony
and five limit punishment to that of a misdemeanor. Vermont does not have an unauthorized
duplication statute, and the Indiana legislature repealed its unauthorized duplication statute
because its larceny statute covered the same offense. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-43-4-2, 3543-5-2(4) (Michie 1998).
35
Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (effective Feb. 15, 1972);
cf. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (including “sound
recordings” in the list of protectable works of authorship).
36
Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, supra note 16 at § 2319.
37
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:223 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999).
38
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:223.3 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999).
39
Id. at 223(5). MO. ANN. STAT. §570.255.2 (1997).
40
N.Y. PENAL LAW §420.00 (McKinney 1999).
41
Id.
42
Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 9.
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performances from commercially sold recordings without the permission of
the owner of the master record or tape.43 The defendant moved for dismissal,
arguing that California’s statute conflicted with the Copyright Clause. Once
the defendant’s dismissal was denied, he entered pleas of nolo contendere
and pursued state appellate remedies. The Supreme Court agreed to review
the defendant’s case after his argument failed in the California courts. In the
Supreme Court, the defendant again argued that Congress alone had the
authority to regulate unauthorized duplication via the Constitution’s grant of
such authority and Congress’ passage of the 1909 Act. The defendant argued
that either the Copyright Clause or the 1909 Act preempted California’s
sound recording legislation.44 The Goldstein Court held that the Copyright
Clause did not preempt the area for the following reasons: state regulation is
not necessarily inconsistent with providing an incentive to promotion of the
arts; state protection may provide an incentive where there is no national
interest (given national diversity); state regulation will not adversely
influence other states because it will only be effective within its own border;
and, Congress can always preempt later if the state regulation causes
problems.45
The court also found that Congress did not occupy the sound recording
field with the 1909 Act,46 which originally protected only the lyrics and
music of a song.47 A sound recording copyright protects the fixed
performance of the lyrics and music by a particular recording artist.48 In
effect, Congress’s decision in 1909 not to cover sound recordings meant that
Congress did not intend to regulate them, but that the states could regulate; it
did not mean that sound recordings should remain unregulated by either the
federal or state governments.49
Although not enacted until 1982, the effective date of the federal
unauthorized duplication law50 is retroactive, i.e. February 15, 1972.51 It is at
this point that Congress, under its Copyright Clause authority, occupied the
field of sound recordings. The existence of a federal law regulating the same
43

Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 548-49 (1973).
Id.
45
See id. at 558-60, 571.
46
See id. at 570, n.28.
47
Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 9.
48
As a simple illustration, Joe writes a song and gives Jane permission to record herself
performing that song. If Jimmy then wants to record himself performing the same song, he
must either pay or get permission from Joe, but he does not need to get permission from Jane.
If Jimmy wants to sell copies of Jane’s performance, he then must obtain Jane’s permission.
49
See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 570.
50
See Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, supra note 16.
51
See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, § 3 (effective Feb. 15,
1972); see also Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 8 (addressing preemption of state laws for
sound recordings fixed on or after February 15, 1972).
44
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activity a state law regulates is sufficient to preempt the use of the state law
under the Supremacy Clause.52 Thus, state unauthorized duplication laws can
only apply to sound recordings fixed and released prior to February 15,
197253 even though few state statutes specify this as the “cut-off” date. The
federal law governs sound recordings fixed after that date.

B. Anti-Bootlegging
Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia currently have antibootlegging statutes.54 Anti-bootlegging statutes benefit performers, as well
as arenas and promoters, by prohibiting the unauthorized fixation of live
performances.55 Various definitions imbedded in the Constitution and Title
17 apply to the controversial term “fixation” and imply that anti-bootlegging
laws are copyright laws. The Constitution authorizes Congress to grant rights
to authors for their “Writings”56 and Congress granted such exclusive rights
in Title 17 of the United States Code.57 Specifically, Section 102 affords
copyright protection to “Writings” by defining them as “original works of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression, from which they can be
communicated either directly or with the aid of a machine.”58 It then lists
works of authorship, including musical works and sound recordings, but it
does not include “live performances” in this list of copyrightable works.59
Title 17 defines a sound recording as a work that results from the
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds.60 Title 17 also states
that a work is “created” when it is fixed for the first time and that a “work is
‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than a transitory duration.”61 A live performance is not

52

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-27, at 497 (2nd ed. 1998)
[hereinafter TRIBE]; U.S. CONST. art. VI.
53
See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 571.
54
Of these statutes, thirty-four allow for punishment of bootlegging as a felony and one limits
punishment to that of a misdemeanor. Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, and
Vermont do not have anti-bootlegging statutes. See, Table of State Copyright Statutes,
Appendix 1.
55
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 275.15-.20 (McKinney 1999).
56
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
57
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
58
Id. § 102.
59
See id.
60
Id. § 101.
61
Id.
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inherently “fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” and thus does not
fall within the subject matter of copyright law as enacted by Congress.62
State and federal anti-bootlegging statutes protect different interests;
therefore, the analysis applied by a court considering a violation of a state
statute can vary considerably from a similar violation under the federal
version. A New York appellate court upheld the state’s anti-bootlegging
statute under a Copyright Clause preemption claim in 1980.63 The
prosecution charged the defendant with numerous counts involving
unauthorized recording of sound, specifically a 1978 radio broadcast of the
group Blondie performing works that had not been previously fixed.64 The
court compared the subject matter protected by the New York antibootlegging statute to the subject matter protected by federal copyright law.65
It distinguished the two laws by finding that the state statute did not require
proof that a recording had been fixed.66 It further found that the essence of
the state anti-bootlegging law was to prohibit the recording of live
performances without the consent of the performers.67 The court upheld the
state anti-bootlegging statute because it protected different types of works
than those the federal copyright law protected.68
There are other examples as well. Alabama and New Mexico
specifically provide that the performer is presumed to own the rights to
record or authorize the recording of the live performance, obviating the need
to prove the lack of consent.69 Mississippi presumes the performer’s right to
record the live performance, but also presumes in the same section the
performer’s right to display and distribute personal images.70 New Jersey’s
Anti-Piracy Act adds the requirement that the offender have knowledge that
the live performance has been recorded with the consent of the owner, but
also allows a law enforcement officer or even a theater employee to detain a
suspected bootlegger for a reasonable time to recover the illegal recording.71
New York law provides that it is a third degree felony to operate a recording
device in a motion picture theater or live theater without the authority of the
theater operator, not the performer.72 Interestingly, it appears that a plain
reading of the New York statute would exempt recordings in outdoor venues.
62

Id. § 102.
See People v. M & R Records, Inc., 432 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
64
See id. at 847.
65
See id. at 850.
66
See id.
67
See id.
68
See id.
69
ALA. CODE §13A-8-81(3)(e) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-16B-5.C (Michie 1998).
70
MISS. CODE ANN. §97-23-87(2)(b) (1999).
71
N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:21-21c(3) & g (West 1995).
72
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 275.32 (McKinney 1999).
63
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One wonders how this works with Good Morning America’s concerts in
Bryant Park or The Today Show’s concerts in Rockefeller Plaza.
Furthermore, the violation is elevated to a second degree felony if the
recording is fifteen minutes or more in length.
By comparison, in the federal statute, Title 17’s fixation definition also
states that a work being transmitted is “fixed” if a fixation is being made
simultaneously with the transmission.73 Artists may authorize certain parties
to fix the sounds of their performances. The medium upon which those
parties fix or record the performances then contain a copyrightable work.
This situation is no different than when a band authorizes its record label to
record its performance in a recording studio. The sound recordings are
worthy of the same copyright protection regardless of whether they contain
studio recordings or live performances, as long as the artist has granted
fixation permission.74 Legal author Henry H. Perritt, Jr. offers the following
specific example:
[S]omeone who gives an extemporaneous lecture is not entitled to
copyright protection in the lecture because there is no fixation, but
if the lecturer causes someone to record the lecture as it is being
given, the lecturer enjoys a copyright in the recording (and perhaps
in the lecture itself). Moreover, if the lecture is being ‘transmitted’
at the same time that it is recorded at the direction of the lecturer,
both the recording and transmitted representation enjoy copyright
protections (emphasis added).75
Federal copyright law requires authorized fixation before it grants
protection to any original work of authorship.76 This creates a question about
whether state anti-bootlegging laws protect the same rights as federal
copyright laws and may not be preempted by Title 17 or Congress’s
Copyright Clause authority.
However, Congress did pass an anti-bootlegging statute in 1994,
criminalizing 1) the unauthorized fixation of live musical performances; 2)
the transmission to the public of live musical performances; 3) the
distribution, sale, or rent of unauthorized fixations of live musical recordings;
and, 4) trafficking in unauthorized fixations of live musical performances, if
the actor acted without the consent of the performer, knowingly, and for

73

17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
See id. (emphasis added).
75
See HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 68 § 10.5, at 428
(1996).
76
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
74

Fall 2014/Cowart, et al./321

purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.77 Previously, the
1976 Act had provided for civil liability for bootlegging, but explicitly stated
that the federal law did not preempt state statutes.78
The Eleventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of the federal antibootlegging law in United States v. Moghadam.79 The defendant in this case
was one of thirteen convicted after United States Customs confiscated
approximately 800,000 bootleg CDs with a street value of approximately $20
million.80 According to the court’s analysis, what little legislative history
exists suggests that Congress enacted the anti-bootlegging statute under its
Copyright Clause authority.81 The defendant challenged Congress’s authority
based on the argument that live performances are not “fixed” as required by
the Copyright Clause.82 If the Moghadam Court agreed with the defendant
that live performances were not fixed, it would have to hold that Congress
exceeded its Copyright Clause authority. However, the Eleventh Circuit
avoided deciding the fixation issue by considering the situation that arises
when a federal law is not authorized under the Copyright Clause but is
authorized under another of Congress’s Constitutional powers.83
The Moghadam Court concluded that Congress can use its power under
the Commerce Clause to regulate bootlegging activities. Assuming arguendo
that the law did not satisfy the Copyright Clause requirements for federal
regulation, the Moghadam Court held that Congress’s Commerce Clause
power did authorize the law.84 In effect, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Commerce Clause can provide the source of Congressional power that
affirms a law’s constitutionality when the “the extension of copyright-like
protection is not fundamentally inconsistent with the . . . requirement[s] of
the Copyright Clause.”85
77

See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 8 at § 1101.
79
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036
(2000).
80
See Stan Soocher, Appeals Court Backs Anti-Bootlegging Statute, 15 ENT. L. & FIN. 3 (June
1999) at 3.
81
See id. at *8, citing 140 Cong. Rec. H11441, H11457 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994) (statement
of Rep. Hughes). See also Keith V. Lee, Resolving the Dissonant Constitutional Chords
Inherent in the Federal Anti-Bootlegging Statute in United States v. Moghadam, 7 VILLANOVA
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 327 at 356-57 (citing the congressional debate over the federal law and
discussion of the commercial detriment of bootlegging).
82
The fixation requirement is embedded in the definition of “Writings,” which is used in the
Copyright Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress is only authorized to protect original
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See Copyright Act of
1976, supra note 8.
83
See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1273.
84
See id. at 1277.
85
Id. at 1281.
78

322/Vol. XXIV/Southern Law Journal

No other Circuit Courts have decided whether the Commerce Clause or
the Copyright Clause authorizes Congress’s enactment of the antibootlegging law. On March 27, 2000, the Supreme Court denied writ of
certiorari in the Moghadam case, allowing the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that
the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to regulate bootlegging to stand.86
Although the Eleventh Circuit stated in dicta that it did not think the
Copyright Clause authorized the federal bootlegging law,87 neither the
Supreme Court nor any of the Circuit Courts has decided this issue either.
The determining factor is “fixation”—if the performance of a musical work
is sufficiently fixed at the point of performance, then the performance is
protectable as a sound recording under Title 17 and the federal antibootlegging statute applies.88 The federal law thus would preempt state antibootlegging statutes in cases where the performance was fixed on or after
February 15, 1972, the date Congress extended copyright protection to sound
recordings.89 However, as long as the Supreme Court allows the Eleventh
Circuit’s Moghadam holding that the Commerce Clause authorizes
Congress’s enactment of 2319A, to stand, courts are free to decide the issue
otherwise.90 Such exercise of the Commerce Clause power in combination
with the Supremacy Clause allows Congress to regulate unauthorized
fixations.91 The existence of a federal law regulating the same activity a state
law regulates is sufficient to preempt the use of the state law;92 therefore, the
federal anti-bootlegging law preempts state statutes at the time of its
enactment in 1994.93
Two more recent district court decisions have renewed the debate over
the constitutionality of anti-bootlegging laws. In KISS v. Catalog Passport
Int’l Prods., Inc., and United States v. Martignon, the district courts held that
the federal bootlegging laws exceed Congress’s authority under the
Copyright Clause.94 The decisions dramatically contradict the Eleventh

86

Id.; see United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1036 (2000).
87
See id. at 1273.
88
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
89
See Sound Recording Act of 1971, supra note 35; see also Copyright Act of 1976, supra
note 8 (addressing preemption of state laws for sound recordings fixed on or after February 15,
1972).
90
See Moghadam,175 F.3d at 1269.
91
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. VI.
92
See TRIBE, supra note 52, § 6-27, at 497.
93
See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
94
See KISS v. Catalog Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004) and
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, (S.D.N.Y. 2004), respectively. See also
David Patton, The Correct-Like Decision in United States v. Martignon, 16 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1287, 1298-99 (2006); Andrew B. Peterson, To Bootleg or Not to
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Circuit’s Moghadam decision. A current issue of scholarly debate is whether
or not Congressional power to legislate in the area of intellectual property
should be cabined by the 23 words of the Copyright Clause.95

C. True Name and Address
A third type of state copyright legislation is known as “true name and
address” legislation. A true name and address statute regulates the replication
process and distribution of sound recordings.96 Although applicable to both
legitimate and illegitimate products, the statute is designed to prevent the
distribution of illegal sound recording products.97 Forty-six states and the
District of Columbia have true name and address statutes.98 There is no
federal true name and address statute, so there are no real preemption issues
here.
Statutes generally require that an in-state manufacturer include its actual
name and the state where the product was manufactured99 on the product’s
Bootleg? Confusion Surrounding the Constitutionality of the Anti-Bootlegging Act Continues,
58 OKLA. L. REV. 723 (2005).
95
The constitutional basis for both Congressional enactments come from two clauses in
Article I Section 8: the Commerce Clause and the Copyright Clause. A current area of debate
among Constitutional law scholars is whether the commerce clause provides this authority.
See Brian Danitz, Martignon and KISS Catalog: Can Live Performances Be Protected?, 15
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143 (2005); Angela T. Howe, Annual Review
2005: Part II: Entertainment Law and New Media: VIII: Entertainment & Constitutional Law:
a Note: United States v. Martignon & KISS Catalog v. Passport International Products: The
Anti-Bootlegging Statute and the Collision of International Intellectual Property Law and the
United States Constitution, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, (2005); William Patry, The
Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: an Imminent Constitutional
Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 394-97 (1999),; contra. Joseph C. Merschman,
Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting the Commerce Clause End Run
Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661, (Winter, 2002). This
paper adopts the position taken by Patry and others, that the Rehnquist Court rejected the
notion that Congress’s enumerated powers are hermetically sealed.
96
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653w (West 1999). It is notable that North Carolina includes
software programmers in its true name & address statute, but does not require software
producers to disclose the name of their programmers. N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-435(a) & (b)
(1993).
97
See Anderson v. Nidorf, 26 F.3d 100, 102 (9th Cir. 1994).
98
Of those laws, thirty-seven allow for punishment of a violation as a felony and nine limit
punishment to that of a misdemeanor. The New Hampshire statute does not specify penalties
for true name and address violations. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 352-A:3 (1995). Hawaii,
Maine, Vermont, and Wyoming are the only states without true name and address statutes.
99
Note the difference between “replication” and “manufacture.” The true manufacturer of a
sound recording is the holder of the master recording, usually the record label. A master
recording goes through a process in which the manufacturer may create (or cause the creation
of) many intermittent components before finally finishing with the product that will then be
replicated for distribution. Additional “pressings” ordered by the manufacturer would then
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label, and that all sound recording products transferred commercially within
the state contain the actual name and address of its manufacturer, whether instate or out-of-state. If an illegitimate manufacturer includes its own true
name and address on the product replicated and that product is confiscated,
the manufacturer is in compliance with the true name and address statute.
However, law enforcement will be able to use the true name and address on
the product to obtain an affidavit from the actual copyright owner that the
owner did not license to the “manufacturer.” Then either the state or federal
government can choose to charge the manufacturer under the applicable antipiracy law (for example, unauthorized duplication or anti-bootlegging). If a
pirate tries to avoid such detection by not including its true name and address
(it may include a false name or address, like the name and address of the
sound recording owner-record label, or it may omit certain information), the
state may charge the manufacturer under the true name and address statute
without having to prove whether the replication of the recording is
authorized. This type of statute thus allows for simpler prosecution of record
pirates. Prosecutors do not have to call expert witnesses to examine the
validity of the sound recording, and artists or record labels who own the
copyright do not have to appear in court to testify whether or not they
authorized the replication. There is no rational reason for a legitimate
manufacturer to avoid including the true name and address on a product’s
label. All products should clearly display the true name and address on their
outside labels such that prosecutors can charge the manufacturers with either
unauthorized duplication or violation of the true name and address statute for
any illegitimate product that is replicated within the state or that is in
commerce in the state.
The first decision addressing the constitutionality of California’s true
name and address statute was People v. Anderson,100 in which a California
appellate court found the defendant guilty of violating the state’s true name
and address statute.101 In the case that followed, Anderson v. Nidorf, the
defendant argued that federal copyright law preempted California’s statute.102
merely need to be replicated, rather than proceeding through the entire manufacturing process.
Each type of media has its own manufacturing process. In this case, the word “replication” is
used to refer to the actual duplication, or copying, of the product and the word “manufacturer”
is used to refer to the holder of a master or the person who orders the replication of a sound
recording. Legitimate manufacturers are those parties who own the right to copy either
because they are the initial owner of the right (record labels) or because the owner has issued
to them a license of that right.
100
People v. Anderson, 235 Cal. App. 3d 586 (1991).
101
CAL. PENAL CODE § 653w (West 1999).
102
Anderson, 26 F.3d at 101. The defendant also argued that the statute violated the First
Amendment. In response, the court noted that the statutes can be narrowly designed to serve a
particular public need. The court concluded that California had a compelling interest in
protecting the public from being victimized by false and deceptive commercial practices such
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Preemption is appropriate when a state creates legal or equitable rights
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within Section 301.103 One of the
purposes of federal copyright law is to protect the rights of copyright owners;
California’s true name and address statute shares that purpose, but also has a
consumer protection purpose.104 According to the California court, federal
copyright law does not share this consumer protection purpose.105 Further,
California’s statute prohibits the selling of labels that do not disclose the
“true name and address” of the manufacturer; it does not prohibit copyright
infringement.106 The court held that federal copyright laws do not protect
equivalent rights and thus do not preempt the state statute.107
A New York court similarly resolved a case challenging the New York
true name and address statute.108 The defendants in this case were charged
under New York’s unauthorized duplication,109 anti-bootlegging,110 and true
name and address statutes. The court upheld the constitutionality of New
York’s true name and address statute and stated, “[i]ndeed careful
examination of Section 275.15 establishes that it is not a copyright statute,
but rather a consumer protection statute enacted to protect the public from
purchasing records under a false belief that they were, in fact, recorded by
the performer or group named on the record jacket.”111
In a case involving the distribution of unidentified video cassettes, the
New York true name and address statute again passed the constitutionality
test.112 The court discussed federal copyright law’s Section 301 preemption
test, which allows for preemption of state statutes that regulate an equivalent

as piracy of legitimate music industry product. Additionally, the court reasoned that the
“speech at issue is deemed as commercial speech, which is subject to less severe scrutiny than
other forms of protected communication.” The court stated that where commercial speech is
affected, the state need only show a reasonable relationship between the statute and the state's
interest in preventing deception of consumers. See id.
103
See Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 8.
104
See Anderson, 26 F.3d at 102. The federal copyright law protects the rights of copyright
owners because it is an incentive to them to continue creating and sharing their works with the
public. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to enact laws that “promote the
progress of Science and the Useful Arts”).
105
See Anderson, 26 F.3d at 102.
106
See id.
107
See id.
108
See People v. M & R Records, Inc., 432 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
109
The recordings involved were fixed before February 15, 1972; thus, the federal
unauthorized duplication law did not yet apply and did not preempt use of the state statute. See
id. at 847.
110
The bootleg recordings involved were created in 1978, prior to the existence of the federal
anti-bootlegging law. See id.
111
Id. at 850.
112
People v. Borriello, 588 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
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right with respect to a work of authorship protectable under copyright law.113
Again the court sustained the true name and address statute, holding that
copyright infringement was not an element of an offense under the true name
and address statute and therefore, the statute did not affect equivalent rights
within the scope of federal copyright law.114
Other state courts have addressed the constitutionality of their true name
and address statutes. A Maryland appeals court upheld its true name and
address statute due to the statute’s consumer protection purpose.115 The
Georgia Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal for the purpose of
deciding whether the state’s law requiring a label bearing the name and
address of the “transferor” of a sound recording was preempted by the
Copyright Act.116 It decided that the labeling requirement added an extra
element and precluded preemption. The Supreme Court denied certiorari to a
Washington court of appeals case in which the court also upheld the true
name and address statute’s constitutionality under the defendant’s Copyright
Clause preemption challenge because the Washington statute contained an
“extra element” to that of copyright infringement—failure to disclose the
origin of a recording.117

D. Optical Disc Identification
Optical disc identification legislation (hereinafter “ODIL”) is important
as a non-technical answer to a technology-driven problem. The term “optical
disc” includes digital storage formats such as audio CD, video CD (VCD),
CD-read only memory (CD-ROM), and digital versatile disc (DVD).
Virtually the same technology and equipment are used to create the master
versions of all optical disc formats.118 The digital format allows for highquality, near-exact replication of the masters, and of copies of the masters, in
mass quantities.119
Optical disc piracy is often associated with organized crime and has
become increasingly mobile, enabling wrongdoers to move around to avoid
detection and to take advantage of territories where enforcement is less
effective.120 Thus, optical disc piracy has become a global problem. Further,
113

Id. at 994.
Id. at 995-96.
115
See Hicks v. State, 674 A.2d 55 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
116
Briggs v. State, 638 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. 2006).
117
See State v. Awawdeh, 864 P.2d 965 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 441
(1994).
118
Users need only make relatively minor modifications to CD-mastering and CD-replicating
equipment to use the same equipment to master or replicate CD-ROMs or DVDs.
119
See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 22, at 93.
120
See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
114
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facilities for mastering and replication may be totally devoted to
unauthorized activity or may supplement income from legitimate activity
with infringing production, making it difficult for investigators to trace the
source of piratical activity. ODIL provides investigators with the necessary
tools that lead to the successful prosecution of intellectual property pirates.
There is no federal ODIL at this point, but three states have enacted ODIL:
California,121 Florida,122 and New York.123
ODIL requires in-state replicators124 to permanently mark every optical
disc containing sound recordings that it replicates with a unique identifier.125
If a replicator includes such an identifying mark on an illegitimate product
and that product is confiscated, law enforcement will know where to begin
the search for the record pirate, which may be a party beyond the replicator,
like a customer-manufacturer. Then the prosecutor may charge the pirate
under the relevant anti-piracy statute (federal or state unauthorized
duplication, for example). If a replicator does not properly mark optical
discs, the state may charge the replicator under ODIL without having to
prove whether the replication of the recording is legitimate and can still bring
charges against the replicator under the more traditional anti-piracy laws.
Like true name and address statutes, ODIL allows for simpler prosecution of
record pirates. It also provides additional motivation for replicators to verify
the legitimacy of its customers’ orders.
ODIL encourages replicators to make sure that any replication orders
they receive from customers are accompanied by the proper licenses that
grant the customers permission to make copies. If law enforcement traces an
illegitimate copy to a replicator, the replicator should provide evidence that
replication rights were granted by the copyright owner. If the replicator does
not have this evidence, the replicator may be guilty of unauthorized
duplication. Presumably, law enforcement will seek to contact the customer
who placed the order and include the customer as a party to piracy. In effect,
ODIL should limit the number of replicators that will be willing to provide
121

See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 21800-21806 (West Supp. 5A 1999).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5615 (West 2000).
123
See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 390-a (McKinney 2000).
124
Note here again the difference between “replicator” and “manufacturer.” See supra note 99.
ODIL uses the term “manufacturer,” but defines it to mean “a person who replicates the
physical optical disc or produces the master used in any optical disc replication process.” CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 21802. This paper will continue to use the term “replicator” to refer to
the party that must comply with ODIL. See also Larry Jaffee, CA Law Requires ID on Discs,
REPLICATIONNEWS Dec. 1998, at 1, 68 (discussing California’s ODIL and referring to the
language “manufacturers,” but discussing the responsibilities of “replicators”).
125
See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 21800 (West 1999). California recently amended its
ODIL laws to authorize law enforcement to inspect commercial disc manufacturing facilities,
without a warrant or prior notice, to ensure they are properly marking the discs. CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 21803 (West 1999) (as amended effective Jan. 1, 2012).
122
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illegal services to customers. Replicators then hold the responsibility for
ensuring that only legitimate product leaves their factories. All optical discs
replicated after the effective date of a state’s ODIL should contain the unique
identifier so that prosecutors can charge the replicators with either
unauthorized duplication or ODIL violations for any illegitimate product that
leaves the factory. Further, commercial replicators should stop taking
illegitimate orders from customers in an effort to protect themselves from
ODIL or other anti-piracy lawsuits.
It is obvious that ODIL creates a burden on in-state replicators by
requiring them to mark optical discs with a permanent126 and unique
identifier. The in-state burden exists also in that some manufacturercustomers do not want the replicators’ names on their optical discs.127 Those
manufacturers may hire out-of-state replicators located in states without
ODIL to perform their pressings.128
ODIL not only requires in-state replicators to comply, but also may
require that optical discs distributed in the state’s commerce comply.129 If so,
out-of-state replicators must also mark their products with unique identifiers
if they know or intend that their product will enter the “stream of commerce”
in one of the ODIL states. In-state and out-of-state replicators may have to
reconfigure their pressing machines and other mastering and replicating
equipment to create a way to permanently mark optical discs. This burden is
actually smaller than it appears.
Commercial mastering and replication facilities already voluntarily
participate in optical disc identification. The IFPI and Philips Consumer
Electronics have developed the Source Identification (hereinafter, “SID”)
Code to “enhance the security of CD manufacturing at both the mastering
and replication stages.”130 Under the SID Code system, there are two codes: a
Laser Beam Recorder Code, which identifies the plant that manufactured the
master, and a Mould Code, which identifies the plant that replicated the

126

A permanent mark could conceivably include a mark made by a permanent marker; thus,
independent artists who replicate their own optical discs using generic commercial equipment
like CD-burners may comply by hand-writing their identifiers on their optical discs.
127
See Larry Jaffee, supra note 124.
128
See id. (revealing that a sales representative of an Austin, Texas replicator has received
phone calls from California-based brokers inquiring whether they could use its services
instead of using those of their regular California replicators).
129
See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 21805 (West 1999) (“Any person who buys, sells,
receives, transfers, or possesses for purposes of sale or rental an optical disc knowing that the
identification mark required by this chapter has been removed, defaced, covered, altered, or
destroyed, or knowing it was manufactured in California without the required identification
mark . . . is guilty.”).
130
IFPI, SID Code Implementation Guide, http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/sid-codeimplementation-guide.pdf (visited Mar. 12, 2013).
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disc.131 According to the IFPI, SID Codes have been allocated to about 80
percent of the world’s 484 known CD plants and account for about 96
percent of the world’s identifiable manufacturing capacity.132 Compliance
with ODIL should only be a burden for the remaining 20 percent of the
world’s known CD plants and 4 percent of the world’s identifiable
manufacturing capacity. Those facilities that do not participate in the SID
Code program are more likely to be involved in illegitimate replication. Thus
as with the true name and address statutes, the burden ODIL creates is most
borne by those participating in illegal unauthorized duplication.
ODIL is also similar to true name and address laws in that it may help to
protect the public, although California’s state legislative history does not
mention such an intent.133 Unlike true name and address statutes, ODIL does
not provide customers with a name and address to contact the manufacturer if
an optical disc is unsatisfactory; ODIL assists law enforcement in locating
the source of illegitimate product, action that only indirectly benefits
consumers. However, there should be no Copyright Clause preemption
problem in applying state ODIL because it does not cover an equivalent right
protected under federal Copyright Law, as discussed previously in other true
name and address cases.134 Therefore, these statutes apply to all sound
recordings, regardless of whether replication of them is authorized or
unauthorized. Further, they do not attempt to regulate the same activities that
any federal law regulates; thus, the Supremacy Clause likely does not
preempt them.

IV. CONCLUSION
While § 301 of the Copyright Act is broad and sweeping in scope, it is
clear that state copyright law is alive and well, at least for now. In addition to
the four state law claims outlined in this paper, courts have also allowed state
law claims for unfair competition, unjust enrichment, breach of contract,
misuse of trade secrets, and right of publicity.135 However, some scholars
argue that allowing state copyright law claims to proceed interferes with the
goal of national uniformity in copyright law.136

131

See id.
See id.
133
See California Committee Reports dated 4/21/98 (Assembly), 5/6/98 (Assembly), 6/22/98
(Senate), 6/30/98 (Senate), and 8/30/98 (Senate).
134
See supra text accompanying notes 102-117.
135
Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the Copyright
Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2007).
136
Id. at 108.
132
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The Senate made the following statement when considering the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, implementing the World Intellectual
Property Organization treaties:
The copyright industries are one of America’s largest and fastest
growing economic assets. According to International Intellectual
Property Alliance statistics, in 1996 (when the last full set of
figures was available), the U.S. creative industries accounted for
3.65 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) -- $278.4
billion. In the last 20 years (1977-1996), the U.S. copyright
industries’ share of GDP grew more than twice as fast as the
remainder of the economy -- 5.5 percent vs. 2.6 percent. Between
1977 and 1996, employment in the U.S. copyright industries more
than doubled to 3.5 million workers -- 2.8 percent of total U.S.
employment. Between 1977 and 1996 U.S. copyright industry
employment grew nearly three times as fast as the annual rate of
the economy as a whole -- 4.6 percent vs. 1.6 per percent. In fact,
the copyright industries contribute more to the U.S. economy and
employ more workers than any single manufacturing sector,
including chemicals, industrial equipment, electronics, food
processing, textiles and apparel, and aircraft. More significantly for
the WIPO treaties, in 1996 U.S. copyright industries achieved
foreign sales and exports of $60.18 billion, for the first time leading
all major industry sectors, including agriculture, automobiles and
auto parts, and the aircraft industry.137
Intellectual property industry groups like the RIAA,138 the Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc.,139 the Interactive Digital Software
Association,140 the Software & Information Industry Association,141 and the
Business Software Alliance,142 are interested in maintaining some level of
uniformity in national copyright law. Indeed, as mentioned in the
introduction to this paper, the Copyright Office has recommended that pre137

S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998).
The RIAA sponsored ODIL in California and New York. Its website is at
http://www.riaa.com.
139
The Motion Picture Association of America sponsored ODIL in Florida. Its website is at
http://www.mpaa.org.
140
The Interactive Digital Software Association’s website is at http://www.idsa.com. It along
with the RIAA, the Motion Picture Association of America, and others have all supported the
passage of California’s ODIL. See Larry Jaffee, supra note 124.
141
The Software & Information Industry Association website is at http://www.siia.net. It is a
trade association that represents the interests of the software and digital content industry.
142
The Business Software Alliance’s website is at http://www.bsa.org. It represents the global
interests of software publishers.
138
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1972 sound recordings be brought under federal jurisdiction before they are
allowed to enter the public domain in 2067.143 Other scholars have likewise
argued that the variance in state copyright law term, duration, and fair use
exceptions leads to confusion among copyright holders if federal law is not
applied.144 Federal unauthorized duplication and anti-bootlegging laws have
been important steps toward fighting music piracy that ignores state
boundaries. However, as pirates continue to take advantage of new
technologies, state and national boundaries may erode. Thus, the state true
name and address and ODIL statutes are important tools that investigators
can use to help identify the source of piratical activity. Prosecutors can use
these laws to send piracy cases through the state legal system more
efficiently and with better results. However, these state-specific laws cannot
effectively fight piracy until every state has such laws or until Congress
legislates for the nation.

143

A Study on the Desirability of and Means for Bringing Sound Recordings Fixed Before
February 15, 1972, Under Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 6.
144
See Erlinger, supra note 2 at 67-68; see also Gard & Anapol, supra note 1, at 130.
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APPENDIX 1
Table of State Copyright Statutes

State

Penalty—
Unauthorized
Duplication

Unauthorized
Duplication

Bootlegging

True Name
& Address

Alabama

Felony

X145

X146

X147

148

X149

Alaska

Misdemeanor

X

Arizona

Felony

X150

X151

X152

Arkansas

Felony

X153

X154

X155

California

Felony

X156

X157

X158

Felony

160

X

162

Colorado

X

Felony

X

X163

Delaware

Felony

X164

X165

DC

Felony

X166

X167

X168

169

170

X171

145

Misdemeanor

X

X

ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-81 to -82 (1994).
ALA. CODE § 13A-8-81(a)(2) (1994).
147
ALA. CODE Sec. 13A-8-83 ; 13A-8-86.
148
ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.900(a) (Michie 1998).
149
ALASKA STAT § 45.50.900(a)(2) (Michie 1998).
150
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3705(A) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
151
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3705(A)(5) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
152
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3705(A)(3),(4) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
153
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-510(b) (Michie 1997).
154
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-510(b) (Michie 1997).
155
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-510(c) (Michie 1997).
156
CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1999).
157
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 653s, 653u (West 1999).
158
CAL. PENAL CODE § 653(w) (West 1999).
159
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §21800-21807 (West 1999).
160
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-4-602 to -603 (West 1999).
161
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-604.
162
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-142b, -142f (West 1997).
163
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-142c.
164
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 920-921 (1995).
165
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 922(a).
166
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3814 (1996).
167
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3814(b) (1996).
168
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3214.01 (1996).
169
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.11(2)(a)(1)-(2) (West 1997).
170
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.11(2)(a)(3), (3)(a)(2) (West 1997).
171
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.11(3)(a)(3) (West 1997).
172
FLA. STAT. ANN. §817.5615 (West 1997).
146

X159

161

Connecticut

Florida

Optical Disc
Identification

X172
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State

Penalty—
Unauthorized
Duplication

Unauthorized
Duplication

Georgia

Felony

X173

Hawaii

Felony

X175

Idaho

Misdemeanor

X176
178

True Name
& Address

X177
179

X

X180

X181

X182

Felony

Indiana

Felony

Iowa

Felony

X183

Kansas

Felony

X185

X186

X187

Kentucky

Felony

188

X

189

X

X190

Louisiana

Felony

X191

X192

X193

Maine

Felony

X194

Maryland

Felony

X195

X196

X197

Felony

198

199

X200
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X174

Illinois

Massachusetts

X

Bootlegging

X184

X

GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-60(a) (Harrison 1998).
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-60(b) (Harrison 1998).
175
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 482C-1 to -2 (Michie 1998).
176
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7603(1) to -(2) (Michie 1997).
177
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7603(3) to 18-7604 (Michie 1997).
178
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-7(a)(1)-(2), -8(a) (West 1993).
179
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-7(a)(4) (West 1993).
180
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-8 ; 5/16-7(b)(5) (“unidentified sound or audio visual“
defined as without having a true name and address).
181
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-1(b)(8)(B) (Michie 1998).
182
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4-10-4; § 24-1-10-5 (Michie 1998).
183
IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.15(1) (West 1993).
184
IOWA CODE ANN. §14.15.2 (West 1993).
185
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3748 to -3749 (West 1996).
186
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3748(a) to-3749 (West 1996).
187
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3750 (West 1996).
188
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.445(1), (3) (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1998).
189
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.445(2) (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1998).
190
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.445(4) (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1998).
191
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:223 (West 1998).
192
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:223.5 (West 1998).
193
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:223.6, 14:223.3(West 1998).
194
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.10, § 1261(1)-(2) (West 1997).
195
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 467A(a) (1996).
196
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 467A(a)(2)-(3) (1996).
197
MD. ANN. CODE., CRIM. LAW § 7-308(d)(2) (1996).
198
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 143A (West 1992).
199
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §143B (West 1992).
200
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §§ 143C, 143D (West 1992).
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Michigan

Felony

X201

X202

X203

Minnesota

Felony

X204

Mississippi

X205

X206

X207

X208

209

210

Missouri

Felony

X

X

X211

Montana

Felony

X212

X213

X214

Nebraska

Misdemeanor

X215

X216

Nevada

Felony

X217

X218

New
Hampshire

Felony

X219

X220

X221

New Jersey

Felony

X222

X223

X224

New Mexico

Felony

X225

X226

X227

Felony

228

229

X230

New York
201

X

X

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1052(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1999).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1052(1)(a) (West Supp. 1999).
203
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 752.1053-.1054 (West Supp. 1999).
204
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325E.169-.201 (West 1995).
205
MINN. STAT. ANN. §325E.18-.201 (West 1995).
206
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-23-87 to -91 (1999).
207
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-87(2)(b) (1999).
208
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-89 (1999).
209
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 570.225-.255 (West 1999).
210
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 570.226-.230 (West 1999).
211
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 570.240, .241, .255 (West 1999).
212
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-13-141 to -147 (1997).
213
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-13-142(2), 30-13-143(2) (1997).
214
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-144 (West 1999).
215
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1323 to -1326 (Michie 1995).
216
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1324, -1326 (Michie 1995).
217
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.217 (Michie 1997).
218
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 205.217(2), 193.30 (Michie 1997).
219
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 352-A:1 to :5, 352:1 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
220
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 352-A:2(I)(b), (II)(b) (1995 & Supp. 1998).
221
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 352-A:3, 352-A:5.
222
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-21 (West 1995).
223
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-21(c)(3) (West 1995).
224
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-21.c(4) (West 1995).
225
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16B-1 to -9 (Michie 1998).
226
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16B-5 (Michie 1998).
227
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16B-4(Michie 1998).
228
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 275.00-.30, 275.35-.45, 420.00-.05 (McKinney 1999).
229
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 275.15-.20 (McKinney 1999).
230
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 275.35, 275.40 (McKinney 1999).
231
N.Y. GEN BUS. Law §390-a (McKinney 1999).
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North
Carolina

Felony

X232

X233

X234

North Dakota

Felony

X235

X236

X237

Ohio

Felony

238

X

Oklahoma

Felony

X240

X241

X242

Oregon

Felony

X243

X244

X245

Pennsylvania

Felony

X246

X247

X248

Rhode Island

Felony

249

X

250

X

X251

South
Carolina

Felony

X252

X253

X254

South Dakota

Felony

X255

Tennessee

Felony

X257
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X239

X256
X258

X259

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-432 to -437 (1993).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-433(a)(3) to -(4) (1993).
234
N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 14-435; 14-437 (1993).
235
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-21.1-01 to -06 (1978).
236
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-21.1-02(2) to -(4) (1978).
237
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-21.1-03 (1978).
238
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.52, 1333.99(E)-(F) (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1998); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.32 (Anderson 1996).
239
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1333.52(B);1333.9(F) (Anderson 1996).
240
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1975-1981 (West Supp. 1997).
241
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1978 (West Supp. 1997).
242
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21§1979 (West Supp. 1997).
243
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 164.864 to -.869, 164.873, 164 .876 (1990 & Supp. 1998).
244
OR. REV. STAT. § 164.869 (1990 & Supp. 1998).
245
OR. REV. STAT. § 164.872 (1990 & Supp. 1998).
246
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4116 (West 1983 & Supp. 1998).
247
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4116(d.1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1998).
248
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §4116(e) (West 1983 & Supp. 1998).
249
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-15 (1992).
250
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-15(a)(2) to -(3) (1992).
251
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-15(c) (1992).
252
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-910 to -950 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1997).
253
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-915 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1997).
254
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-930, 16-11-940 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1997).
255
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-43A-1 to -7, 22-6-1 (Michie 1997).
256
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-43A-3 (Michie 1997).
257
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-14-105, -115, -139 to -140 (1997).
258
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-139(c) (1997).
259
TENN. CODE ANN. §39-14-139(a) (1997).
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Texas

Felony

X260

X261

X262

Utah

Misdemeanor

X263

Virginia

Felony

X265

X266

X267

Washington

Felony

X268

X269

X270

West Virginia

Felony

X271

X272

X273

Wisconsin

Felony

X274

X275

X276

Felony

277

278

X264

Vermont

Wyoming

260

X

X

TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.91to -.96 (West Supp. 1999).
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.93 (West Supp. 1998).
262
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §35-94(a) (West Supp. 1998).
263
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-10-1 to -8 (1996).
264
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-10-8 (1996).
265
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-41.1 to .6 (Michie 1998).
266
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-41.2 (Michie 1998).
267
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-41.4, 59.1-41.6 (Michie 1998).
268
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.25.010 to -.901 (West 1999).
269
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.25.030 (West 1999).
270
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §19.25.040 (West 1999).
271
W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50 (1997).
272
W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50(a) (1997).
273
W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50(a) (1997).
274
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.207 (West Supp. 2000).
275
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.208 (West Supp. 2000).
276
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.209 (West Supp. 2000).
277
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-13-201 to -206 (Michie 1999).
278
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-202(a)(ii) (Michie 1999).
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